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The emergence of the ethanol in-dustry has generated substantial profi ts for individuals involved 
in ethanol and corn production.  How-
ever, different sectors of the industry 
benefi t at different times.  Outlined 
below are the benefi ciaries and when 
they benefi t.  This is shown graphically 
in Figure 1.
To understand how returns are al-
located, it is important to understand 
the role of prices.  The price of ethanol 
is the major factor determining the 
total amount of revenue to be divided 
among the participants in the ethanol 
industry.  The price of corn determines 
how this revenue is allocated between 
the ethanol producer and the corn 
farmer.  The cropland cash rental rate 
(essentially a price) determines how the 
revenue received by the corn farmer is 
divided between the farm operator and 
the land owner.
Another important concept is that prof-
its accrue to the limiting resource in 
the production chain.  This can be seen 
when we trace how the profi ts of the 
ethanol industry have been allocated so 
far (Figure 1) and how the profi ts are 
expected to be allocated in the future.
First Temporary Benefi ciary 
-- Ethanol Producers
During the initial expansion period of 
ethanol production during 2005 and 
2006, large profi ts accrued to ethanol 
producers.  They benefi ted from the 
combination of high ethanol prices and 
low corn prices.  Ethanol prices were 
high and demand was strong due to the 
need to supply the oxygenate mar-
ket vacated by (Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether) MTBE.  At the same time, corn 
prices were low due to overproduction. 
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The small size of the ethanol produc-
tion capacity was the limiting resource.
However, ethanol production is a com-
modity business.  It sells a commod-
ity (ethanol) and buys a commodity 
feedstock (corn).  Typically commodity 
industries expand production capacity 
until profi ts are driven to a minimum.  
The generous profi ts generated dur-
ing this period attracted others to the 
industry in an attempt to also capture 
generous profi ts.  So more ethanol 
plants were built and the industry 
expanded. Production capacity expands 
until either ethanol is oversupplied and 
the price is driven down and/or corn 
shortages emerge and the price of corn 
increases.  Ethanol production capacity 
is no longer the limiting resource.  As 
shown in Figure 1, this started to occur 
in late 2006.
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Note: Between 2005 and 2006 the farmer breakeven increased substantially.  Although some costs increased during this time 
period, most of the increase is due to the loss of government payments due to higher corn price.
Figure 1 Explanation
(Everything is expressed as dollars per bushel of corn)
Ethanol Price ($/bu.) -- Ethanol revenue is the ethanol price 
received by the ethanol producer.  However, ethanol revenue 
is not shown as dollars per gallon of ethanol.  Rather, it is 
shown as dollars per bushel of corn ($ per gal. times 2.8 gal. 
per bu. equals $ per bu. of corn).
Ethanol Production Costs (net of DDGS revenue) ($/bu.) 
– This amount includes all ethanol production costs ex-
cept corn.  Because an ethanol facility also produces DDGS 
(distillers dried grains with soluble), the sale value of the co-
product is deduced from the cost to create a net cost.  This 
net cost is subtracted from the Ethanol Price to compute the 
Ethanol Breakeven Corn Purchase Price (below).
Ethanol Breakeven Corn Purchase Price ($/bu.) – The 
breakeven purchase price is the maximum price that the 
ethanol producer can pay for corn and still break even.  Pay-
ing less (more) than the Breakeven Corn Purchase Price will 
generate profi ts (losses) for the ethanol producer (farmer).
Corn Price ($/bu.) – This is the price ethanol producers pay 
for corn and farmers receive for corn.
Landowner Farmer Corn Price Breakeven ($/bu.) – This is 
the breakeven corn selling price for farmers who own their 
land (debt free).  Selling for a higher (lower) price than the 
breakeven generates profi ts (losses) for the farmer.
Corn Production Input Costs (net of government pay-
ments) ($/bu.) -- The amount is computed by adding the 
cost of production inputs, machinery and labor together and 
subtracting the government payments received by the farm-
ers.
Renter Farmer Corn Price Breakeven ($/bu.) – This is the 
breakeven corn price (minimum selling price) for farmers 
who cash rent their land.  Selling for a higher (lower) price 
than the breakeven generates profi ts (losses) for the farmer.  
The breakeven is computed by adding the cost of cash rent 
to the breakeven for the landowner farmer.
Landowner Return ($/bu.) -- This amount is the cash rent 
landowners receive who rent their land to tenant farmers.
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Second Temporary Benefi ciary -- Corn Producers
As ethanol production capacity expands, the limiting factor 
in the supply chain changes from ethanol production to corn 
production.  The price of corn (the limiting feedstock) is bid 
up.  As corn price moves upward, ethanol profi ts are shifted 
from ethanol producers to farmers.  As shown in Figure 1, by 
mid-2008, almost all of the profi ts accrue to farmers.  How-
ever, as farmers expand corn production to take advantage 
of these generous profi ts, they begin bidding up the price of 
production inputs.
Third Temporary Benefi ciary – Input Suppliers
As farmers expand corn production, they bid up the price 
of production inputs such as fertilizer, chemicals, and seed.  
Higher input prices generate larger input profi t margins for 
agribusinesses.  This leads to competition and expanded in-
put production capacity, which over time limits input prices 
and profi t margins.  The exceptions are production inputs 
whose ingredient price increases such as natural gas in the 
production of nitrogen fertilizer, and inputs with proprietary 
information like seed companies.
Permanent Benefi ciary – Land Owners
Cropland is the eventual limiting resource in the supply 
chain.  All other segments of the supply chain can expand to 
meet demand.  But the amount of corn produced is lim-
ited by the number of acres of farmland available for corn 
production.  So, excess profi ts are bid into rental rates and 
land values.  Over time cash rental rates rise until most of 
the profi ts accrue to the land owner.  The other segments of 
the supply chain give up their profi ts because they expand 
through competition until they earn only normal profi ts.
Putting it All Together
Figure 1 shows the allocation of profi ts from ethanol produc-
tion from 2005 to the present time.
How do we expect the graph to play out over the coming 
years?  Based on our previous discussion, the price of corn 
will stay near the breakeven corn purchase price of ethanol 
producers.  Also, the breakeven corn selling price for the 
cash rent farmer will move up and converge with the price of 
corn.  The increase in breakeven price will come from higher 
corn production costs.  Although a portion of this cost 
increase will be due to higher input prices (seed, fertilizer, 
etc.), the primary increase will be due to higher cropland 
rental rates.  Neither the ethanol producer nor the cash rent 
farmer will continue to receive any excess profi ts.  The major 
portion of the excess profi ts will accrue to the land owner 
in terms of higher cropland cash rental rates.  Because the 
higher cash rental rates increase the return to land owner-
ship, the price of cropland will increase in conjunction with 
cropland rental rates.
The breakeven corn price for the farmers who own their land 
will not increase as much.  So they will continue to earn ex-
cess profi ts.  But these profi ts accrue from owning land.  Not 
from operating a farm.  
If Boom Turns to Bust
The ethanol boom is expected to continue as long as the 
subsidies, export tax, and mandates stay in place.  However, 
what if critical industry elements change and the price of 
ethanol falls sharply?  For example, an alternative transporta-
tion fuel is developed that makes ethanol obsolete.  How will 
this affect the scenarios described above?
Essentially the same scenario will play out, except it will 
involve losses rather than profi ts.  Ethanol producers are the 
fi rst segment hit with losses.  Many of the facilities will stop 
production, either temporarily or permanently.  This softens 
the demand for corn and corn prices decline.
Declining corn prices transfer the losses to farmers.  With 
corn prices plummeting below breakeven levels, substantial 
losses are incurred by farmers.  Government price support 
mechanisms are of little value because, during the ethanol 
boom, corn breakeven prices moved signifi cantly higher and 
are above the support mechanisms.
Farmer losses will soften the demand for production inputs 
and cropland.  Production input prices will decline and 
tighten the margins for suppliers.  More importantly, crop-
land rental rates will be forced down over time.  However, 
these adjustments will not occur immediately.  They will oc-
cur gradually, imposing substantial losses on farm operators 
in the meantime.
If Ethanol Busts, But Agriculture Booms
There is another scenario that may occur.  A scenario where 
ethanol production busts but the agriculture sector continues 
to boom.  With this scenario, the demand for traditional uses 
of corn and other grains increases to take up the slack cre-
ated by the waning ethanol demand for corn.
A continuation of the rapid economic expansion of China, 
India, and other parts of the world could precipitate this 
scenario.  As people’s incomes increase, they tend to change 
to a diet with larger amounts of meat.  Expanding meat 
production requires a substantial increase in the supply of 
feed grains. This would use the corn previously designated 
for ethanol production.  However, as with the fi rst scenario 
(above) the eventual benefi ciary of the boom is the cropland 
owner.
Conclusion
Due to the rapid emergence of the biofuels industry, the 
agriculture sector is going through a period of rapid change.  
How the future of the biofuels industry will evolve is uncer-
tain.  Regardless of how it evolves, residual profi ts or losses 
will accrue to the limiting resource.  The current limiting 
resource is the amount of cropland.  So, residual profi ts 
(losses) will accrue to land owners.  However, it is not an 
instantaneous process.  During the economic adjustment 
process, the other players in the supply chain will benefi t or 
lose.
